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v. 
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FROM THE LAW AND CHAKCERY COURT OF NORFOLK. 
''The briefs shall be printed in type not less in size than 
small pica, and shall be nine inches in length and six inches 
in width, so as to conform in dimensions to the printed 
rerords along with which they are to be bound, in accord-
ance with Act of Assembly, approved March 1, 1903; and 
tbe clerks of this court are directed not to receive or file a 
brief not conforming in all respects to the aforementioned 
requirements.'' 
The foregoing is printed in small pica type for the infor-
mation of counsel. 
H. STEW ART JONES, Clerk. 
1?/1 I /Ia 
IN THE 
· Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICH~fOND. 
SOPHIE BUKV A 
vs. 
F. D. ~fATTHEWS AND DENNIS D. TUTTLE. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR AND SUPERSE-
DEAS. 
To the Honorcible Judges of the Supren~e Court of Appeals 
of Virginia: 
. Your petitioner, Sophie Bukva, respectfully represents unto 
the Court that she is aggrieved by an order of the Court 
of La'v and Chancery of the City of Norfolk, entered on the 
16th day of July, 1926, upon a motion for judgment for 
breach of contract then pending in said Court, wherein F. D. 
Matthews and Dennis D. Tuttle were plaintiffs and your pe-
titioner and American Investment Corporation were the de-
fendants, oy which order judgment was entered on the ver-
dict of the jury rendered in said action against your pe-
titioner in the sum of $899. A complete copy of the re.cord 
in said case is presented herewith as a part of this petition. 
Unless otherwise indicated, italics where used are petitioner's. 
References are to the manuscript record. 
The action was to recover 899, claimed to be due "to plain-
tiffs by defendants for breach of contract * * * for the pur-
chase and exchange of certain real estate". The jury's ver-
dict was against both defendants for the full amount claimed. 
'rhe Court, upon motion, set aside the verdict as to the Ameri-
can Investment Corporation, but refused to set aside the ver-
dict against your petitioner, and entered judgment against 
her for the amount of the verdict. · 
1', ' ,. ' ' I.:·~. :·l 
'I 
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TI-IE FACTS. 
The evidence was brief, and the facts are substantially as 
follows: Early in February, 1926, F. D. Matthe\vs, one of 
the plaintiffs below, sought to bring about an exchange of 
certain ·real estate at vVilloughby Beach owned by N. B. 
Joynes for certain real estate on 35th Street, Norfolk, and 3 
acres of land in Princess Anne County, belonging to Sophie 
Bukva, who had gotten the properties from her sister about 
a year before. The negotiations were with Paul Bukva, 
husband of your petitioner, and the said Matthews and Tut-
tle and Paul Bukva · we·l'lt out together to see the Joynes' 
IJroperty. Subsequently, on February 4, 1926, 1\!atthews went 
to the Bukvas' home, with a prepared offer to purchase the 
Joynes property and to pay therefor partly in money and 
partly in real estate, and after some negotiation the said 
Paul Bukva signed the .offer as attorney for Sophia Bukva 
and as secretary of the American Investment Corporation, 
having first adde~ a postscript in reference to commissions. 
It was thought at the time that the Lansdale lots belonged 
to the corporation, but they in fact belonged to your petitioner. 
It was verbally agreed between 1\'Ir. Bukva and ~Ir. Mathews 
at the time that if the offer was not accepted by 1\Ir. Joynes 
before 12 o'clock on the follo\ving Saturday, the same would 
thereupon become null and void. The signature of :Nir. 
,Joynes not having been optainecl ·by the time named, ~Ir. 
Bukva verbally agreed with ~fr. 1\iatthews that the time 
should be extended to 12 o'clock on the following ~Ionday. 
Mr. Joynes accepted the offer a few minutes before 12 o'clock 
on 1\lfonday. A copy of the offer and acceptance will be 
found at page 2 of the manuscript record. 
It was testified by Ivir. Matthews that petitioner was present 
when the offer was signed and when the time was extended, 
and that she acquiesced in the same (R. 6), but this was de-
nied' by 1'\{r. Bukva (R. 20), and by Mrs. Bukva, who stated 
that she did not authorize the signing of the offer, was not 
present when it was signed or the extension was made, and 
did not know that such offer had been signed until after 
the same had been accepted by Mr. Joynes (R. 22-23). This 
\vas a very important point in the case, as it \vas substan-
tially all of the evidence to show that Mr. Bukva was au-
thorized to make the contract on behalf of the petitioner, 
other than the power of attorney mentioned below, which the 
Court, during the argument of the case and over the objec-
tion of petitioner's counsel, instructed the jury "constituted 
~sufficient authority in Paul Bukva to make the contract now 
Sophie Bukva v. F. D. Matthews and D. D. ~uttle. 3 
lJeing sued on" (R. 29). The evidence showed that Ml_.. 
Matthews had made several deals for Mrs. Bukva in which 
1\IIr. Bukva had acted for ~Irs. Bukva (R. 8), but it was the 
uncontradicted testimony of petitioner that in such cases she 
first saw the property and approved the deal, and that she 
signed all deeds herself (R. 23). It was also stated by Mr. 
B.ukva (R. 20), but denied by 1\{r. 1\Iatthews (R. 7) that the 
offer was signed upon the express condition that it was not 
to be effective until J\1:rs. Bukva, after seeing the Joynes 
property, should approve the same. It 'vill thus be seen that 
· the testimony as to what occurred at the time the offer was 
signed and the extension was allowed by 1\fr. Bukva was in 
absolute conflict, but the jury were not allowed to 1Ja8S On 
this conflict of testi1nony, for by the above instruction the 
right of 1\{r. Bukva to make the offer as attorney for his 
\vife 'vas established as a matter of law, and it was no longer 
for the jury to decide whether the contract sued on had been 
signed in her name with her approval or while she was 
present. We will presently point out wherein the said in-
struction was erroneous, and to the great prejudice of pe-
titioner. · • 
~Ir. Bukva himself thought the deal was a good one and 
endeavored to induce his wife to agree to it, but she refused 
and declined even to go to look at the Joynes property as. she 
was unwilling to trade for any property at Willoughby Beach 
(R. 21). When her husband on Sunday drove her by the 
Joynes property, she refused to get out and examine it (R. 
21, 22). On Monday morning, l\1:r. Bukva endeavored sev-
eral times to get l\fr. lvla.tthews over the telephone and. tell 
him that Mrs. Bukva would not approve and that the deal 
was therefore off, but was unable to reach him until after 
one o'clock when he did so tell him (R. 21). 
THE POWER OF ATTORNEY. 
The plaintiffs below called for the production of) and in-· 
troduced in evidence, over the objection of your petitioner, 
a power of attorney from your petitioner to Paul Bukva, 
dated April 16; 1920 (R. 14). This power of attorney was 
given about six years before the transaction in question took 
place, at a time when petitioner was about to go to N e\v York 
to be gone for several months. As we shall see, this power 
of attorney only related to property then owned by petitioner, 
whereas the property in question was acquired by her some 
five years later or about a year before the case was tried. 
It was the uncontradicted testimony of your petitioner (R. 
- ~ 
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23) and of Mr. Bul{va (R. 21-2) that the latter did not at any 
time act under this p(nver of attorney; and petitioner testi-
fied that she did not at any time authorize him to enter into 
the contrac.t sued on and that at no time did she acquiesce 
therein (R. 23). She testified that she did not even know 
that her name had been sig11ed to the contract sued on until 
some days after the day she was at Willoughby Beach, which 
was the day before 1\Ir. J oyues accepted the offer (R. 22-
3). 
The only authority given by the power of attorney to the 
attorney in fact, Paul Bukva, was as follows: 
~ «= * ''to execute, acknowledge and cause to be recorded 
any and all deeds or other writings which it may be neces-
sary or desirable for me to execute, including contracts of 
sale or deeds conveying the title to real estate owned by me 
or in which I have any interest, present or contingent, in 
the City of Norfolk or elsewhere, and to do, execute and per-
form all and every other act or acts, thing or things, in law 
needful and necessary to be done in and about the premises 
~s fully, largely and amply to all intents and purposes what-
soever, as I might or could do if I ·were personally present 
and acting for myself." (R. 14). 
It will be observed that this power of attorney contemplated 
only papers that were to be executed by petitioner, and it 
specifically designated "contracts of sale or deeds conveying 
the title to real estate owned by me or in which I have any 
interest, present or contingent". It did not give Mr. Bukva 
the power to sell and fix the price and terms of sale, but 
only "to execute" certain papers, including ''contracts of 
sale"; it did not authorize the purchase of real estate; it 
did not authorize the creation of any obligation on petitioner's 
part to pay out any m,oney; it did not authorize the exchange 
of real estate owned by petitioner for other real estate; it 
did not authorize the acceptance of other 'real estate as part 
of the purchase price for land of petitioner that might be 
sold; it did not authorize the atton1ey in fact to entploy other 
agents and agree to pay them commissions; and it related 
only to property ''owned by 1ne or in ~vhich I have any in-
terest". 
THE CONTRACT SUED ON . 
. 
It will be furthe1~ observed that the contract sued on (R. 
2) is in the form of an offer made by Paul Bukva as attorney 
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for petitioner and as secretary of American Investment Cor-
poration, and accepted by ~ir. Joynes. The offer was "to 
pu .. rchase for the sum· of $11,000'' the property of Mr. Joynes 
at Willoughby Beach; and "in payment for the above prop. 
erty I am to give'' certain property on 35th Street and three 
acres of land at Lansdale, and to pay $2,900 i1~ cash, Mr. 
Joynes to assume a lien of $4,200 on the 35th Street prop-
erty. 
,-- This was either a contract on the part of petitioner to pur-
chase the Joynes p1·op'e'rty and to pay therefor partly in real 
estate and partly in money, or it was an excha;nge of prop-
erties between the parties. It is described in the motion for 
judgment as a co1itract entered into by petitioner "for the 
pu1·chase and exchan-ge of certain real estate" (R. 1). If, 
upon any theory, it could be regarded as a sale of petitioner's 
property, it required petitioner to aecept other property in 
payment therefor, and to pay a cash difference of $2,900, 
neither of which things was authorized or contemplated by 
the power of attorney, which the court-erroneously, we con-
tend-instructed the jury ''constituted a sufficient authority 
in Paul Bukva to enable him to make the contract now being 
sued on'' (R. 29). 
To said contract an addendum was added (R·. 3), which 
contains the sole a,qreetnent with reference to the cotnmissions 
and reads as follows : · 
"It is understood that I am to pay the commission on rny 
z;rope1·ty to F. D. Matthews and D. D. Tuttle in the event 
the exchange of the above properties. In other words, it is 
understood that both parties are to pay the cmnmissions on 
their respective prope1·ties. 
~ (Signed) ''PAUL BUICVA.'' 
J\IIr. Joynes· did not tender a deed to petitioner, and took 
no action to enforce specific performance of the contract. 
The jury's verdict and the judgment against petitioner 
were for 899, which was all that both parties would have had 
to pay. The commissions on the Bukva property would have 
been $469, and on the Joynes property $430 (R. 9). 
ASSIGN~!ENTS OF ERROR. 
Petitioner respectfully submits that the trial court erred 
to the prejudice of petitioner: 
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·· 1. In admitting in evidence the power of attorney of April 
16, 1920 (R. ). 
2. In instructing the jury that the said power of attorney 
"constituted a sufficient authority in Paul Bukva to enable 
. him to make the contract now being sued on". (R. .) 
3. In instructing the jury that they might find against pe-
titioner not only ~or the commissions on her property but 
also for the commissions on the Joynes property. (R. . ) 
4. In giving instruction .No. 5. (R. . ) 
5. In refusing to give instructions ''A'', '' B'' and .' ' C '', 
asked for by petitioner. (R. . ) 
6. In admitt_ing in eviden~e the McCuen contract. (R. .) 
ARGUMENT. 
The motion for judgment, as pointed out above, alleged the 
breach by petitioner and American Investment Corporation of 
a contract ''for the p~trchase and exchanae of certain rea:l 
estate" and a copy of the contract of February 4, 1926, 
was attached thereto. The defendants thought it was am ex-
change. In their letter of February 8, 1926 (R. 11) to Paul 
Bukva, they described the transaction as ''the trade of the 
Willoughby Beach Cottage * * * for 624 West 35th Street, 
and three acres at Lansdale". It is very evident that this 
contract provided either for the 11 pztrchase" of real estate 
by the petitioner, or for an" exchange" of real estate owned 
by the petitioner for other real estate. 
Apart fr·om the power·of attorney, there was, as we have 
seen, an absolute, conflict of evidence as to whether Paul 
Bukva was authorized to make the contract on behalf of pe~ 
titioner, b~tt tha-t question was taken from the jury, when the 
Court verbally instructed the jury, during the argument of 
the case, that the power of attorney of .April16, 1920, "con. 
stituted a sufficient authority in Paul Bukva to enable him to 
make the contract now being sued on" (R. 29). With that 
instruction, it was no longer for the jury to inquire further 
into the matter of authority. The authority was thereby 
nsta blished. 
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THE POWER OF ATTORNEY. 
~ 
It is submitted that the Court should not have admitted said 
power of attorney in evidence and should not have .given 
the said instruction for several reasons. 
Powers of attorney should ·be strictly construed, and one 
dealing with an attorney in fact under a written power must 
take care to see that the attorney has authority to act. 
Hotchkiss v. Middlekauf, 96 Va. 649; 653. 
Bowles v. Rice, 107 Va. 51, 53. 
Colona v. Parksley Nat. Barnk, 120 Va. 812, 825. 
Walker v. Temple, 130 Va. 567, 570. 
31 Cyc. 1407. 
It is submitted that the power of attorney in this case 
(R. 14) whether construed strictly or liberally, did not give 
to the attorney in fact the right to purchase real estate or 
to iJ'xchOJn.ge real estate. Of course, a power to sell does not 
authorize a purchase, nor does it authorize an exchange. 
The transaction must be a sale only for money and for cash 
a.t that. 
''As a general rule a power to sell real estate presump-
tively authorizes a sale for money only, and does not authorize 
a transfer or exchange for other lands, or anything but 
money * * * .'' 
2 Corpus Juris. 618. 
''It is moreover the accepted rule, that in the absence of 
authority to the contrary, a power to sell implies a cash 
sale.'' 
Bowles v. Rice, 107 Va. 51, 53, citing-
2 Corpus Juris. 617. 
Obviously, the power of attorney did not contemplate a 
purchase of real estate for such transaction would not re-
quire execution or acknowledgment by the purchaser; all 
that would be necessary would be a deed executed and ac- . 
knowledged by the seller. And the language used clearly 
shows that the power of attorney had reference only to real 
estate owned by petitioner, which would exclude a purchase. 
If a purchase is excluded, certainly it would not allow a trans-
action where the attorney in fact agreed to purchase real 
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estate and pay for it partly in real estate and partly in 
money. 
-- In.the present case, the attorney in fact offered ''to pur-
chase'' the Willoughby Beach property, while the suit wa~ 
brought "for breach of contract * :11 * for the p1trchase and 
exchwnge of certain real estate". The power of attorney 
was allowed in evidence and the jury were instructed during 
the argument of tl1e case that the said po·wer of attorney 
''constituted a sufficient authority in Paul Bukva to enable . 
him to mal~e the contract sued on'', though the making of the 
contract sued on was not within the po,ver vested in the 
attorney in facL 
It is to be furtl1er observed that the po,ver of attorney 
if it dealt at all with purchases or exchanges, did not give 
to Paul Bukva the power to buy for petitioner any property 
he might choose at any price he might elect to pay, or to ex-
change real estate owned by petitioner for other real estate 
· which petitioner had never seen, or even to sell petitioner's 
real estate ·a-r-a price and upon terms fixed by him, but his 
power was limited to the executim1, of ~ertain papers, includ-
ing contracts of sale. l-Ie did not have the power, therefore, 
to bind petitioner hy the offer of February 4, 1926, to pur-
chase property which she had never seen and which the record 
shows she did not want (R. 22-3). · 
It is further submitted that, since the power given to the 
attorney in fact fas only ''to execute, acknowledge and cause 
to be recorded" certain papers, and he was given no au-
thority which would involve the expense of employing real 
estate agents, the attorney in fact had no power to agree 
on behalf of petitioner to pay· commissions to real estate 
agents. When .the r~al estate agents came to deal with Paul 
Bukva as ag·ent for petitioner, they did so with knowledge 
of. his power. They must be regarded as knowing that he 
had no power to purchase or to exchange real estate, or to 
accept other real estate in payment of the real estate of 
petitioner, or to obligate petitioner to pay real estate com-
missions. 
''It is well established that a party dealing with an agent 
acting under a written authority must take notice of the ex-
tent and limits of that authority. He is to be regarded as 
dealing with the power before him; and he must at his peril 
observe that the act done by: the agent is legally identical 
with the act authorized by the power.'' 
Bowles v. Rice, 107 Va. 51, 53, and cases cited. 
Fi·nch v. Cau.sey, 107 Va. 124, 130. 
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It is further submitted that the power of attorney (which 
we have shown above must be strictly construed), did not pro-
vide for the sale of land subsequently acquired by the pe-
titioner, as was the land in question. It was given at a 
time when she ·was about to leave the city for several months. 
The power given was limited to "real estate ov\rned by me 
or in which I have any interest present or contingent''. The 
phrase was ''present and contingent'', not ''present and 
future"; it covered, for instance, her contingent right of 
dower. It is submitted that "real estate owned by me or in 
which I have any interest", under even a liberal construc-
tion, much less u11der the strict construction required, means 
only real estate owned by petitioner at the time that the 
power of attorney was execued. In Pen-fold v. Warner 
(J\IIich.), 55 N. W. 680 (cited in 21 R. C. L. 884-5), the attor-
ney in fact was authorized ''to bargain, sell or mortgage any 
and all real estate belonging to us or either of us, in any real 
estate in the county or Benzie". The court held that "the 
plain import of this language limits the power to land then 
owned by the parties". But if there could be any doubt as 
to the construction of the word ''owned'', the words ''I have'' 
are present tense and clearly fix the meaning of the po·wer 
of attorney. 
It is respectfully submitted, therefore, that the Court 
should have construed the power of attorney of April 16, 
1920, when it was offered in evidence, as being insufficient to 
authorize the making of the contract of February 4, 1926, 
and should have refused to allo'v the same to go to the jury, 
and that the Court erred in admitting the said power of at-
torney in evidence and in verbally instructing the jury, during 
the argument of petitioner's counsel, that the said power of 
attorney" constituted a sufficient authority in Paul Bukva 
to enable him to make the contract in question". Obviously, 
the . effect of the instruction was to take from the jury the 
question as to whether Paul Bukva had the authority to 
execute the contract sued on, and to fix such authority in 
Paul Bukva as a matter of law. Doubtless, the jury would 
have decided in favor of the petitioner as to the point upon 
which the evidence was conflicting, for even with the Court's 
instruction that the power of attorney was sufficient au-
thority they were two hours in reaching a verdict (R. 34). 
The delay could not have been upon the question of the 
amount of damages, as under another instruction which will 
presently be discussed the jury could not do otherwise than 
nnd for the amount named in their verdiet. 
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THE AMOUNT OF THE RECOVERY. 
Assuming that petitioner was liable to plaintiffs in any 
amount, the trial court erred in refusing Instruction C (R. 
27-28), and in giving the instruction set forth in Bill of 
Exceptions No. 5 (R. 31). The addendum to the contract 
of February 4, 1926, which constituted the entire agreement 
so far as commissions were concerned, was signed ''Paul 
Bukva'' and read~ as follows : 
''It is understood that I am to pay the co·m·mission on 
tny p1·operty to F. D. Matthews and D. D. Tuttle in the event 
the exchange of the above properties. In other words it is 
understood that both parties are to pay the cotnn~issions on 
their respective properties.'' ( R. 3.) 
The petitioner, if she was lialJle fo:r any commissions, was 
to pay the commissions on her property, and Joynes was to 
pay' the commissions on his. This "ras made very clear; 
observe the reiteration in the addendum. But the Court 
refused to give In~struction C limiting the verdict to the com-
missions on the Bukva property and instructed the jury that, 
if they found for the plaintiffs, the elements of damage com-
prised the commissions on the Joynes property also. The 
jury found against petitioner for $899, which represented 
all the cotnrn·issions a~at both pa1~ties wo~tld have had to pay 
(R. 9). This was contrary to the parties' own agreement. 
They had provided how the commissions should be divided-
each was to pay commissions on his or her property. But 
it was contended that since petitioner refused to carry out 
the contract, the real estate agents could not recover from 
Joynes, and therefore they had been damaged by petitioner 
to that extent. But their reasoning 'vas faulty. If they could 
recover the commissions on the Bukva property from. pe-
titioner, they could recover the commissions on the Joynes 
property from Joynes. They could only recover from pe-
titioner in any amount upon the theory that the contract was 
binding upon petitioner and enforceable against her. If that 
were true, Joynes could compel petitioner to carry out the 
trade therein provided for. If Joynes did not choose to com-
pel petit~oner to carry out the contract, that did not relieve 
him of liability to· the real estate agents. This Court has 
·SO decided. The first syllabus in Middle Atla-ntic ltn. Co. v . 
. .A.rdan, 115 Va. 148, which is fully sustained by Judg~ ICeith's 
opinion,.is as follows: · 
r---·- ~---
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"If a real estate agent or broker, in pursuance of his con-
tract with a land owner, has found a purchaser ready and will-
ing to comply with the vendor's terms, and has brought the 
parties together, and they have entered into a valid contract 
of sale which the vendor can enforce and the sale has been 
completed so far as the agent is concerned, he cannot· be de-
prived of his compensation by the voluntary release of the 
vendee and refusal of the vendor to consummate the sale, 
without the assent· of the agent. So likewise, the vendor is 
liable to the agent for his compensation if, without the latter's 
consent, he release the vendee rather than incur the expense 
or annoyance or delay of litigation.'' 
If the contract of February 4, 1926, is a valid contract of 
sale which 1\Ir. Joynes could enforce, then the plaintiff below 
could recover of :1\fr. Joynes his 'part of the commission; if 
it was ·not a valid contract, then they were not entitled to re-
cover commissions of either petitioner or Mr. Joynes. On no 
theory, justified by the facts in this case, were they entitled 
to recover the Joynes commissions from petitioner. 
Again, there was no privity between the parties as to the 
commissions on the Joynes property. The plaintiffs were 
not parties to the eontract. The offer was addressed to them 
as ''agents", obviously as agents for N. B. ,Joynes, who it was 
1rnown was the o'vner of the Willoughby Beach property, and 
Mr. Joynes accepted the offer over his own signature. The 
body of the offer made no reference to commissions, but in an 
addendum, it was provided specifically that each party should 
pay only the commissions on his or her property (R. 3). The 
plaintiffs sued for "breach of contract", and not to recover 
damages on the ground that plaintiffs were deprived of the 
right to recover against Joynes by reason of any act of pe-
titioner (if such an action would lie); but under ·no circum-
stances can they recover of petitioner more than the amount 
it had been agreed should be paid as commissions on her 
property. It was argued that Joynes could have recovered 
from petitioner any damage he may have suffered by reason 
of her failure to carry out the contract, and that this would 
embrace the commissions due by Joynes to plaintiffs. But 
Joynes did not choose to sue either for specific performance 
.>r for breach of contract; and the plaintiffs did not have the 
right to sue on his behalf either for specific performance or 
to recover any damage Mr. Joynes may have suffered in the 
way of commissions due by him to defendants. Plaintiffs 
appear to have brought their suit just as if they were Mr. 
J oynes-they sue ''for breach of contract • e • for the pur-
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chase and sale of certain real estate'' (R. 1). There was no 
privity between the plaintiffs and petitioner as to the com-
missions claimed to be due on the Joynes property. I-Ier 
obligation in this regard, if there was any, was to 1\fr. Joynes. 
As to the commissions on the Joynes property, this case is 
analogous to the case of Faison and Matthis v. J,farshb~trn, 
182 N. C. 133, 108 S. E. 5iO. Matthis, a rea.l estate agent, 
sold a lot to Marshburn for Faison, the owner, who ·had 
agreed to pay him whatever the land sold for in excess of 
$125 per acre. It was sold for $142.50 per. acre to Marsh-
burn, who failed to comply. The owner did not pursue the 
matter, but Matthis brough.t suit in the name of himself and 
the owner against the p~rchaser to recover his brokerage 
amounting to about $1,400. The Court said: 
"We fully eon cur with his honor below that, upon the 
evidence, J. J. Matthis is not entitled to recover ·of the 
defendant, l\Iarshburn, and further, that the compla.int fails 
to allege facts sufficient to constitute a valid cause of action. 
It will be observed that J. F. Faison, the owner of the land, 
is not insisting or demanding tl1at tJ1e defendant comply with 
his bid. No deed has been tendered, and he expressly states 
that he is not asking for any relief in this action. The broker 
is seeking to recover his commissions out of the prospective 
purchaser without any sale having been consummated. His 
agreement was with Faison, the owner of the land, not with 
the defendant.'' 
In Le illaster v. Dalhart Real Estate A.lJency (Texas), 121 
-S. W. 185, the Court said: 
''A mere selling agent or broker has no such interest in a 
· contract for the purchase of land secured by him as au-
thorizes a recovery of damages in the way of lost commis-
sions from the proposed purchaser who has refused to eom-
ply with the contract.'' 
The second syllabus in Bit·d v. Rowell (Kansas), 167 S. W. 
1172, which property states the opinion of the Court, is as 
follows: 
"Where a broker, employed by defendant and a third per-
son to procure a sale 01~ exchange of their respective lands 
for a commission, induced them to enter into a valid con-
tract for an exchange with knowledge that both were liable 
for colhmissions, and defendant waR financially able to carry 
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out his contract, but without legal excuse refused to do so, 
the broker could not· recover from defendant for the amount 
of commission the third person had contracted to pay on 
theory that the defendant had defeated the broker's right to 
recover from the third person. '' 
And even if an action of tort should lie to recover the com-
. -missions on the Joynes property, it would first have to be 
made to appear that plaintiffs could not recover of Joynes. 
As the Kansas Supreme Court said in the last mentioned 
case: 
"Under the facts of this case, before the plaintiff can 
recover of defendant the commission Wolfe agreed to pay, 
he must show that Wolfe cannot be held liable therefor and 
that defendant's act caused such liability. Let us see whether 
vVolfe is exempt from such liability. To keep the matter 
clear, let us consider this question as if there was but one com-
mission due plaintiff, and that from Wolfe for procuring a 
purchaser of Wolfe's farm. In such case whenever plain-
tiff obtained a purchaser financially able to buy, which pur-
chaser Wolfe accepts, and the purchaser enters into a valid 
written agreement with Wolfe to purchase on the terms 
named, then plaintiff has· earned his commissions, even though 
the purchaser afterwards refuses to carry out the contract.'' 
It is respectfully submitted that, if the plaintiffs were en-
titled to recover at all in this action, they were entitled to 
recover only the commissions on the Bukva property, which 
would be about one-half of the amount of the verdict. 
NO RIGHT OF ACTION AGAINST PETITIONER. 
But 'vere plaintiffs entitled to recover any amount against 
petitioner Y Tne sole contract for commissions is embraced 
jn the addendum to tht? contract ·which is an agreement on 
the part of Paul Bukva to pay commissions on the 34th Street 
and Lansdale properties if the deal went through. The ad-
dendum was signed "Paul Bukva". The suit is on this con-
tract. The jury were not allowed to consider whether it was 
intended that Paul Bukva or petitioner should pay commis-
sions on the properties owned by petitioner. The Court 
should have given Instruction "B" (R. 27). But even Paul 
Bukva was to pay commissions only if this deal went through 
(R. 3). He favored the trade (R. 21) and it did not fail 
because of any fault of his. 
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INSTRUCTIONS NO. 5 f\-ND A. 
It is submitted that the Court erred in giving instruction 
No 5 (R. 26), and in refusing to give defendant's instruction 
''A" (R. 27). According to the testimony of both sides (R. 
6, 20), the offer made in the contract of February 4, 1926, 
. was to be null and void if it was not accepted by noon on 
the following Saturday, and it 'vas not so accepted (R. 20-21)·. 
Even if Paul Bukva had authority to make any offer, it was 
necessary that a new offer in writing should be mad8, and 
the mere verbal agreement of ·Paul Bukva (R. 20) to trade 
on the basis of the null and void contract of February 4, 
1926, if the same should be accepted by l\1:r; Joynes by noon 
on the following Monday was not sufficient. Not only was 
it opposed to the statute of frauds, but the said Bukva 's. 
authority was expressly limited to papers that could be exe-
cuted, acknowledged and. recorded. 
McCUEN CONTRACT IMPROPERLY IN EVIDENCE. 
In an effort to establish authority in Paul Bukva as agent 
for petitioner to make the offer of February 4, 1926, which is 
the basis of this snit plaintiffs offered in evidence a cer-
tain agreement between American Investment Corporation, 
vendee, and J. H. McCuen, vendor, dated 1\{arch 6, 1926, 
under ·which there was an exchange of properties between 
the vendor and vendee (R. 16), to the introduction of which 
paper in evidence as testimony against her, petitioner ob-
.iected on the ground that this transaction was subsequent 
to the ·contract now sued on, and related to real estate which 
1\IIrs. Bukva did not own, but the court overruled her o b-
jec.tion and allo,ved the said contract to be introduced in 
evidence against her to which action she excepted (R. 32-3). 
The uncontradicted evidence of petitioner showed that she did 
not own any interest in the property involved in the Mc-
Cuen deal (R. 23). The said property was owned by Ameri-
can Investment Corporation, in which she was a stockholder 
and she signed her own name as secretary of the corpora-
tion. It did not appear why Mr. Bukva signed her name ·to 
the paper by himself as attorney; there 'vas no necessity for 
her signature. It is submitted that this paper should not 
have been admitted in evidence against petitioner. - · 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL. 
A motion to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial was 
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made by the defendants, the grounds therefor being sub-
stantiallv the reasons set forth in the above assignment of 
error, 'except that there was the additional ground that there 
was no evidence justifying a verdict against the American . 
Investment Corporation. The trial court sustained the 
motion as to the American Investment Corporation, but 
overruled the same as to petitioner and entered the order now 
complained o£ (R: 4). We submit that the motion should 
have been sustained as to petitioner also. 
CASE ONE OF PECULIAR HARDSHIP. 
The record presents a case of peculiar hardship. Petitioner 
owned a house and lot in Norfolk and three acres of land in 
Norfolk County. Her husband 'wanted to trade these lots 
for certain property at Willoughby Beach, and he made the 
offer in question, as he testified, to a real estate agent, with 
whom he was on very friendly terms, upon the express con-
dition that tpe offer was not to be binding until his wife 
should see flie Willoughby Beach property and approve the 
deal. She was unwilling ·to trade_ for the Joynes property 
a.nd when she refused even to look at it, her husband at one~ 
endeavored to get in touch with Matthews and tell him Mrs. 
Bukva did not approve, but he was unable to reach him, 
though he made several efforts, until after the offer had been 
accepted by J\fr. Joynes, though Matthews did not then know 
that the offer had then been accepted (R. 21). lVIr. 1\Iatthews' 
testimony conflicted with tl~at of petitioner and Mr. Bukva 
upon questions involving Mr. Bukva 's authority to act for 
petitioner, including the above, but the Court, while pe-
titioner's counsel was arguing to the jury these contested 
facts, instructed the jury that a power of attorney given six 
years before, ~nd under which ::f\.Ir. Bukva had never acted, 
constituted sufficient authority in him to make the contract 
sued on, thereby establishing the authority of Mr. Bukva as 
a matter of law, and taking from the jury these disputed 
points upon which there were as to most of them two wit· 
nesses for petitioner and only one for plaintiff. And fur-
ther the jury were so instructed that they were obliged to 
find against petitioner for about twice as much as she should 
have been required· to pay, even if she had authorized the con-
tract. After the instruction_s set forth in Bills of Exceptions 
Nos. 4 and 5 (R. 29, 30), had been given-and both were given 
during the argument of the case before the jury-there was 
nothing the jury ·could do but find the verdict which they 
brought in, apparently though with great reluctance, for, 
• 
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With all discretion taken from them, it. took them two hours 
in which to -bring themselves to a point where they were will-
ing··to follow the instructions that had been given to thein. 
And now, for these and other errors appearing on the 
face of the record, your petitioner prays that a writ of error 
and supersedeas may issuet and that the judgment complained 
of may be reviewed and reversed. And as in duty bound 
petitioner will ever pray, etc. 
MANN & TYLER, 
SOPHIE BUKV A, 
By JAMES ~fANN, 
Of CounseL 
Attorneys for Plaintiff in Error. 
I, James ~Iann, .an attorney at law practicing in the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, do certify that, in my 
opinion, the judgment complained of in the foregoing pe-
tition should be revie,ved and reversed. 
JAMES MANN. 
Received Sept. 18, 1926. 
H. S. J. 
Writ of error allowed; supersedeas awarded. Bond, 
$1,200 . 
ROBERT R. PRENTIS. 
_ Received Oct. 2, 1926. 
H. S. J. 
VIRGINIA: 
PLEAS before tl1e Court of Law and Chancery of the City 
of Norfolk, at the Court House of said City, on the 
day of September, 1926. 
BE IT REJ\tiE1vf8ERED, that heretofore, to-wit: On the 
15th day of April, 1926, F. D. l.VIatthews ·and Dennis D. Tut-
tle, plaintiffs, by their attorneys, and filed in the Clerk's 
Office of said Court, their Notice of !fotion for J.udgment 
_ a_gainst Sohpie ~ul~ya and American Investment Corpora-
tion, defendant, 111 the words and :figures following: 
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NOTICE OF MOTION. 
To Sophie Bukva and American Investment Corporation, 
Norfolk, Virginia. 
TAKE NOTICE, that we, F. D. Matthews and Dennis D . 
. Tuttle, plaintiffs, will, on the 15th day of April, 1926, move 
the Court of Law and Chancery of the City of N o~folk, Vir-
ginia, for a judgment against you, defendants, in favor of 
pl~intiffs for the sum of Eight Hundred and Ninety-nine 
Dollars ($899.00) with interest from the lOth day of March, 
1926, until paid, same being due to plaintiffs by defendants 
for breach of contract entered into with Sophie Bukva by 
Paul Bukva, Attorney, and American Investment Corpora-
tion by Paul Bukva, Secretary, defendants, on the 4th day 
,of February, 1926, Norfolk, Virginia, for the purchase and 
exchange of certain real estate, a copy of which contract 
is hereto attached and asked to be made a part of this notice, 
which said contract the defendants wholly failed to· per-
form. 
page 2 r Given under our hands this 25th day of March, 
1926. 
F. D. ~IATTHE"\VS and DENNIS D. TUTTLE, 
By J. CARLTON HUDSON, p. q. 
EXliiBIT ''A''. 
Norfolk, Va. Feby. 4tb. 1926. 
F. D. ~fatthews and Dennis D. Tuttle, Agents 
I hereby offer and agree to purchase for the .sum of Eleven 
Thousand Dollars ($11,000.00) all that certain cottage and lot 
J.-ronting 50 ft. on Chesapeake Bay, which said property is 
West of and adjoining the U. S. Government Reservations 
and said lot runs through to and fronts 25 ft. on Ocean View 
Ave. or Boulevard. In payment for the above property I 
am to give my property, 624 W. 35th Street, the owner of the 
,above described Willoughby Beach property is to assume a 
loan now standing on the property 624 W. 35th Street for the 
sum of $4200.00 for three y~ars. I am also to give three 
(3) acres of land at Laudsale, Princess Anne Co. described 
as follows-: 
Sites 87, 93, 94 as per plat attached. 
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·The above mentioned three acres of land at Lansdale are 
free of all encumbrances. I am also to pay .to the owner of 
the a-bove mentioned cottage at Willoughby Beach the sum 
of Twenty-nine hundred dollars ($2900.00) in cash. 
The taxes, interest, rents are to be apportioned as of date 
of transfer of the above mentioned properties. 
Full and final settlement to be made on or be-
. _page 3 ~ fore the lOth day of March, 19~6. 
SOPHIE BUICV A, 
By PAUL B.UKVA, Atty. 
AMERICAN INVESTMENT CORP., 
By PAUL BUKVA, Sec. 
It is further understood that I am to pay the commission 
on the property to F. D. Matthews and D. D. Tuttle in the 
event the exchange of the above properties. In other words, 
it is understood that both parties are to pay the commission 
on their respective properties. 
PAULBUKVA. 
I accept your offer. 
N. B. JOYNES. 
Virginia: 
In the· Clerk's Office of the Court of Law and Chancery 
of the City of Norfolk, on the 25th day of 1\farch, 1926. 
I 
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a copy of the ac-· 
count on which the motion mentioned in the notice hereto 
annexed is to be made. 
W. L. PRIEUR, JR., Clerk. 
By W. S. DREWRY, D. C. 
RETURN. 
Executed this 26 day of Mar., 1926, be delivering a copy 
of the within to Sophie Bukva, Vice-President American 
Investment Corp., a corporation, in the City of Norfolk, 
wherein he resides and wherein the said Corporation is doing 
business. . 
C. H. TUMBLESON, 
City Sergeant City of Norfolk. 
By C. R. LESNER. 
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Executed in the City ~f Norfolk, Va., this the 26 da.y of 
Mar., 1926, by ·serving a copy hereof on Sophie Bukv~ in 
person. 
C. H. TUMBLESON, 
Sergeant City of Norfolk, Va. 
By C. B. LESNER, Deputy. 
page 4 } And afterwards: In the Court of Law and Chan-
cery of the City of Norfolk, on the 19th day of 
April, 1926. · 
This day came the parties, by their attorneys, and there-
upon the defendant pleaded not guilty to which the plaintiff 
replied generally. 
And afterwards: In said Court on the 28th day of April, 
1926. 
This day came again the parties, by their attorneys. and 
then came a jury, to-wit.: ~- B. Dawley, T. E. Waff, W. A. 
Edwards, J. G. Rauscher, Geo. S. Foster, H. L. Davis and 
F. S. Hancock, who being sworn the truth to speak upon the 
issue joined and having heard the evidence returned a ver-
dict in these ·words. "We, the jury, find for the plaintiffs in 
the sum of $899.00". 
Whereupon the defendants moved the Court to set aside 
the verdict of the jury and grant a new trial on the grounds 
that the said verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence 
ihe further hearing of which motion is adjourned. 
And afterwards: In said Court on the 16th day of July, 
1926. 
This day came again . the parties by their attorneys, and 
thereupon the defendant's motion to set aside the verdict 
of the jury and gra;nt a new trial being fully heard by the 
Court is sustained as to the defendant, American Investment 
Corporation, and overruled as to the defendant, Sophie 
Bukva. 
It is therefore considered by the Court that the plain-
tiffs take nothing as to the defendant, American Investment 
Corporation, and that the plaintiffs recover of the 
page 5 } defendant, Sophie Bukva, the sum of Eight Hun-
dred and Ninety-nine Dollars ($899.00) with interest 
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thereon from April 28th, 1926, until paid, and their costs 
in this behalf expended. 
To which ruling and judgment if the Court the defendant, 
Sophie Bukva, excepted. 
At tl1e instance of the defendant, Sohpie Bukva, who de~ 
sires to present to the Supreme Court of Appeals a petition 
for a petition for a writ of error and supersedeas to the judg-
ment, it is ordered that when the defendant or some one for 
her shall give bond with surety before the Clerk of this 
Court in the penalty of $1000.00 conditioned according to law, 
execution of this judgment shall be suspended from that date 
for sixty days from the expiration of this term of Court. 
And afterwards: In said Court on the 14th day of Sep-
tember, .1926. 
This day came Sophie Bukva, by her attorneys, ·and ten-
dered to the Court her bills of exception, numbered 1 to 7, 
both inclusive, which were received; signed and sealed by the 
Judge of this. Court within the time prescribed by law, and 
are now ordered to be made a part of the record in this case. 
~ 
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO. 1. 
· Be it remembered that after the jury was sworn to 
try the issue joined in this cause, the plaintiffs, to prove and 
maintain said issue on their part, introduced the following 
testimony: 
page 6 ~ F. D. MATTHEWS. 
I am one of the plaintiffs in this case. I am a resident of 
Norfolk and have been here all of my life. I have been in 
the real estate business for eighteen years. On February 
4th, 1926, about six o'clock in the afternoon, I went to the 
home of Mr.· Paul Bukva on Mowbray Arch to see him with 
reference to the exchange of certain property belonging to 
his wife, Sophie Bukva, who is one of the defendants. Mrs. 
Bukva opened the door and invited me in, and she then re-
tired to another part of the house. I had had the contract 
typewritten, except the addition in reference to the manner 
of paying coillinissions which was added at the suggestion 
of Mr. Bukva. Paul Bukva and I discussed the matter at 
some length, and finally he agreed to sign the contract, pro-
vided it was not to be effeetive unless it was also signed by 
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Mr. N. B. Joynes, with whom the trade was to be made, be-
fore· 12 o'clock on the following Saturday. Mr. Bukva ex-
plained to her the exchange of the properties as mentioned in 
the contract and it was with her full consent and knowledge 
that Paul Bukva acting for her and for the American Invest-
ment Corporation, signed the contract. This conversation 
was· in the sitting room of their apartment and as I recall it 
Mrs. Bukva went to get either the pen or the ink for him 
to sign the contract. The contract signed by Paul Bukva as 
attorney for Sophie Bukva, and as Secretary of American 
Investment Corporation is introduced in evidence marked 
"Exhibit A". B.efore the contract was signed by 1\!Ir. Bukva, 
he had been with 1\:lr. Tuttle and me to see the Joynes prop..: 
erty. Mr. Tuttle and I were unable to get ~fr. Joynes to 
sign the contract before 12 o'clock on Saturday, 
page 7 ~ and 011 Saturday afternoon I went again to Mr. 
Bukva. 's home and he agreed to extend the time for 
obtaining l\1r. Joynes' signature to 12 o'clock on the follow-
ing Monday, which was February 8th. 1\Ir. Bukva did not 
make it a condition to the contract's becoming effective, 
either at the time it was signed or when it was extended, 
that !tirs. Sophie Bukva should first see the Joynes prop-
erty and approve the deal. This is the first time I have ever 
heard of a verbal condition to the e4!fect that the contract was 
not to become effective until after Mrs. Sophie Bukva should 
first see the Joynes property and approve the deal. There 
is nothing in the contract to this effect and I am positive that 
nothing was ever said regarding a condition that the deal 
was to be approved by 1\Irs. Bukva, until after suit was 
brought, as Mr. Bukva, her attorney in fact, and agent had 
been down to the property, gone over it thoroughly and 
agreed to the contract -nled marked ''Exhibit A'' and agreed 
to an extension of same. I am positive that Mrs. Bukva was 
at home on the Saturday and date of the extension. As I 
recall it Mrs. Bukva asked Mr. Bukva to take me home due 
to the fact that I had so many market packages which he did. 
1 • I recall that 1\fr. Tuttle took me within a block of l\{r. Bukva 's 
house on the Saturday of the extension. 
I informed Mr. Tuttle of the extension, and at about 1 :35 
o'clock on 1\{onday, :1\'Ir. Tuttle phoned me that he had seen 
iVIr. Joynes and had gotten him to sign the contract before 
'~ o'clock. :1\'Ir. Joynes was ready to carry out the contn~oct 
but the other parties refused to carry out the same. 
Mr. ~ukva got me on the telephone about 1:30 
page 8 ~ o'clock on Monday and asked me if Mr. Jovnes 
had signed. I 'told him l\1:r. Tuttle had gone out to 
22 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
see Mr. Joynes and I was almost positive he had gotten his 
signature, but I had not then heard from him and could not 
sa.y until I did hear from him. Almost immediately Mr. Tut-
tle called me and told me he had gotten J\tlr. Joynes' signa-
ture before 12 o'clock. I tried to get l\IIr. Bukva on the 
telephone but he was not at home, and I told Mrs. B]lkva 
the contract had been signed. Later in the day Mr. Bukva 
phoned me and said he was not going through with it. 
We have made demand for the payment of our commis-
sions but nothing has been paid to us. I file in evidence a 
letter to Mr. Bukva dated February 8th, 1926, his reply of 
February 16th, 1926, and copy of a letter from our attorney 
·to Mr. Bukva, dated l\Iarch 1st, 1926, and also a letter from 
J\!Ir. Bukva to ~Ir. ~Iatthews dated April 1st, 1926, marked 
respectively Exhibits "B", "C", "D" and "E". I also 
file in evidence marked Exhibit "F", a. power of attorney 
from Sophie Bukva to Paul Bukva, dated April 16th, 1920. 
I knew of this power of attorney before the contract of Feb-
ruary 4th, 1926, was made. I also introduced in evidence, 
marked Exhibit "G", contract of 1viarch 26th, 1926, known 
as the ~fcCuen contract which was consummated without any 
objection from any source whatever. 
I have made several deals for J\tlrs. Bukva which went 
through in which Mr. Ifukva acted for J\tirs. Bukva. Mr. 
Bukva has r~presen ted himself to me as being in the real 
estate business representing his wife and the American In-
vestment Company. · 
The Bukvas agreed to purchase the Joynes prop-
page 9 ~ erty at Willoughby Beach at the price of $11,000.00 
and they were to give him in payment therefor 
properties owned by them and "rhich they put in at a valu-
ation of $12,300.00. There were no encumbrances or mort-
gages against Mr. Joynes' property, while there was a mort-
gage to be assumed by Joynes on the Bukva property amount-
ing to $4,200.00, giving the Bukvas au equity in their prop-
erty of $8100.00 and to offset it the difference in the equities 
of the Bukva property and the Joynes property was $2900.00, 
which the Bukvas agreed to pay in cash and agreed to pay 
the conimission on $12,300.00. We charged the regular real 
estate commissions as charged in Norfolk which is 5% on 
the first $5,000.00 and 3% on the l1alance or residue, on each 
respective properties, and the total commission amounted to 
$899.00 which represents the damages we have sustained, 
and is the amount for which we have brought suit. If the 
·deal had gone through 1fr. Joynes would have paid us $430.00 
and Bukva $469.00 making a total of $899.00, the amount 
,---~---
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sued for the regular commission ·fixed by the real estate 
exchange. 
EXHIBIT A .. 
Norfolk, V a., Feb 'y 4th, 1926. 
F. D. Matthews and Dennis D. Tuttle, Agents. · 
I hereby offer and agree to purchase for the sum of eleven 
thousand dollars ($11,000.00) all that certain cottage and lot 
fronting 50 ft. on Chesapeake Bay, which said property is 
West .of and adjoining the U. S. Government Reservations 
. and said lot runs thr.ough to and fronts 25. ft. 
page 10 } on Ocean View Ave. or Boulevard. In payment 
for the above property I am to give my property 
624 W. 35th Street, the owner of the above described Wil-
loughby B.each property is to assume a loan now standing on 
the property 624 W. 35th Street for the sum of $4200.00 
for three years. I am also to give three (3) acres of land 
at Lansdale, Princess Anne Co. described as follows: 
Sites 87, 93, 94 as per plat attached. · 
The above mentioned three acres of land at Lansdale are 
free of all encumbrances. I am also to pay to the owner 
of the above mentioned cottage at Willoughby Beach the sum 
of Twenty-nine hundred dollars ($2900.00) in cash. 
The taxes, interest, rents are to be apportioned as of date 
of transfer of the above mentioned properties. 
Full and final settlement to be made on or before the lOth 
day of March, 1926. 
SOPHIE BUKV A, 
By PAUL BUKVA, Atty .. 
AMERICAN INVESTMENT CORP., 
By PAUL BUKV A, Sec.. 
It is further understood that I am to pay the commission 
on my property to F. D. Matthews and D. D. Tuttle in the 
event the exchange of the above properties. In other word-s, 
it is understood that both parties are to pay the commission 
on their respective properties. 
PAUL BUKV.A. .. 
I accept your offer. 
N. B. JOYNES.. 
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Mr. Paul Bukva, 
P. 0. Box, 
Norfolk, Virginia. 
Dear lfr. Bukva : 
February 8th, 1926. 
This is to notify you· that the trade of the Willoughby 
Beach Cottage a.t the Government Reservation for 624 West 
35th Street, and three certain acres at Lansdale, Norfolk 
County, Virginia, belonging to you has been accepted by Mr. 
N. C. Joynes, Sr., owner of the Willoughby Beach Cottage. 
Please let us have your old deeds at once so that we can 
prepare to make settlement at once. 
Yours very truly, 
DENNIS D. TUTTLE SON & CO., 
By DENNIS I. TUTTLE. 
EXI-IIBIT C. 
Paul Bukva, . 
P. 0. Box 1063, 
Norfolk, Virginia. 
Messrs. Dennis Tuttle Son & Co., 
Norfolk, Virginia. 
Gentlemen:-
February 16th, 1926. 
In reply to your favor of the 18th inst. I beg to 
page 12 ~ advise you that as far as I am concerned I was 
dealing exclusively with Mr. Frank Matthews, 
local real estate agent, and no doubt he will gladly advise 
you as to the matter in question. 
Yours very truly, 
PAUL BUKV.A. 
--------- -~-------
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EXHIBIT D. 
Mr. Paul Bukva, 
P. 0. Box 1063, 
Norfolk, Virginia. 
Dear Sir:-
J\farch 1st, 1926. 
J\IIessrs. Matthews and Tuttle have requested me to repre-
sent them in the matter of closing the contract of February 
4th, 1926, executed by Sophie· Bukva by Paul ·Bukva, Attor-
ney, and the American Investment Company by Paul Bukva, 
Secretary, and duly accepted by N. B. Joynes covering the 
sale and transfer of certain properties. 
You will please take notice that J\ir. Joynes is ready, willing 
and able to settle in according with the terms of said contract 
and that I have been authorized to examine title to your 
property, 624 W. 35th Street and sites 87, 93 and 94, Pint 
of S. B.ukva property, Lansdale, Norfolk, Virginia, and will 
a-ppreciate your forwarding copies of deeds conveying the 
above property as it will asst me materially in the examination 
of title. I would also like to know at this time when von 
will be ready to close so we can fix the time and place. .. 
Thanking you for an immediate reply, I am, 
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• JCH/g. 
Mr. Frank J\IIatthews, 
Norfolk, Va. 
Dear Sir:-
Yours very truly, 
J. CARLTON HUDSON . 
EXHIBIT E. 
April, 1926. 
I feel very sorry that I cannot help you now. You well 
know that just now I need all my attention and thought to 
fight a man, you know the type that while professing utmost 
friendship to you strikes you in back. A traite common only 
with the lowest class of Sicilians coming to this country, 
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but very seldom, if at all, found in true and real American 
blood. · . 
And you lmow what tcoke me off my guard? That man's 
wife-intentionally or untentionally, I do not know-helped 
him to decieve me when she told me· over the phone (or to 
my wife) how fond her husband is of me and what a good 
friend of me he is. You know it is hard not to believe a 
Lady. I thought afterwards, I should have put those two im-
portant conditions in writing, but the thought that I was 
dealing not only with a friend, but I thought surely with a 
Gentleman left no doubt in me. . 
Now you see you never can tell when you are 
page 14 ~ folled. Jou know I had many dealings with many 
men in Norfolk during the past 8 or 9 years and 
I do not think that anybody ean say that I di4 not treat him 
fair. I was so utterly fooled by that man that just a few 
days ago I helped him to make a Httle money just out of' pity 
for his precarious condition and thinking that he realized the 
full dirtyness of his acts as I am very quick in forgiving. And 
the man again fooled me. While taking with one hand the 
help to feed him and his family with the other he was pre-
paring to strike me. · 
I hope you will readily see how I feel now. 
Yours truly, 
• . (Signed) PAUL BUKVA . 
EXHIBIT F. 
J{now all men by these presents that I, Sophie Bukva, 
wife of Paul Bukva, of the City of Norfolk, Virginia, have 
made, constituted and appointed, and by these presents do 
make, constitute and appoint the said Paul Bukva my true 
and lawful attorney in fact for me and in my name, place and 
stead to execute, acknowledge and cause to be recorded any 
and all deeds or other writings which it may be necessary 
or desirable for me to execute, including contracts of sale 
or deeds conveying the title to real estate owned by me or 
in which I have any interest, present or contingent, in the City 
of Norfolk or elsewhere; and to do, execute and perform all 
and every other act or acts, thing or things in law needful 
and necessary to be done in and about the premises as fully, 
. largely and amply to all intents and purposes 
page 15 } whatsoever as I might or coul~ do if I were per-
sonally present and acting myself. And I here-
' 
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by ratify and confirm any and all acts done by my said 
:attorney in fact by virtue hereof. 
Given under my hand and seal this 16th day of April, 1920. 
SOPHIE BUKVA, (Seal) 
Virginia~ 
City of Norfolk, to-wit: 
I, James Mann, a commissioner in chancery of the Circuit. 
Court for the City aforesaid, 'in the State of Virginia, do 
certify that Sop~e Bukva, whose name is signed to the· 
writing above bearing date on the 16th day of April, 1920, 
personally appeared and acknowledged the same before me 
in my said City. 
Given under my hand this 16th day of April, 1920. 
Virginia: 
JAMES MANN, 
Com 'r. in Chancery. 
In the Clerk's Office of the Corporation Court of the City 
of Norfolk, on the 21st day of May, 1920. This Power of 
Attorney was this day received and upon the certificate of 
acknowledgment thereto annexed, admitted to record. 
Teste: 
JAMES V. TREHY, Clerk. 
. By F. L. ROBART, D. C. 
Recorded D. B .. 254-A, page 399. 
page 16} EXHIBIT G. 
Official Sales Contract. 
Norfolk Real Estate and Stock ·Exchange .. 
THIS AGREEMENT of Sale made in triplicate this 26th 
day of March, 1926, between American Investment Corpora· 
tion (hereinafter known as the Vendee) and J. H. McCuen 
{hereinafter known as the Vendor) and F. D. Matthews, 
Agent (hereinafter known as the Agent). 
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WITNESSETH: That for and in consideration of the 
sum of Dollars, ( $ ) by cash/check in hand paid, 
receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, the Vendee agrees 
to buy and Vendor agrees to sell for the sum of Dol-
lars ( $ ) , all that certain piece, parcel or lot of land 
described as follows, to-wit: 
My house and lot 524 \Vest 35th Street, Norfolk, Va. 
The purchase price to be paid as follows: 
FIRST: The Dollars ($b----) cash above 
·received to apply on purchase price. 
SECOND: Dollars ($ ) cash when the 
deed is delivered and full settlement is made. 
THIRD: . The Vendee agrees to assume a loan or loans no"\V 
on the property for tl1e principal sum of Six Thousand Dol-
lars ($6,000.00) bearing interest at the rate of 6 per cent per 
annum, payable semi-annually and to sign the deed of bar-
gain and sale before a Notary in witness thereof. For three 
years (3). 
FOURTH: The Vendee further agrees to give a second' 
deed of trust to secure · note for the priri-
page 17 ~ cipal sum of Dollars ($ ) each, 
bearing interest at the rate of six per cent per 
annum, payable semi-annually, same becomeing due and pay-
able as follows: 
The Vendor agrees to convey the above property with a 
general ·warranty deed and the usual covenants of title, same 
to be prepared at the expense of the Vendor. All deeds of 
trust be prepared and all deeds to be recorded at the expense 
of tl1e Vendee. · 
All taxes, insurance, rents and ·interest are to be pro-rated 
as of Aprill, 1926, and settlement is to be made on or before 
April 10, 1926. 
1 It is understood that the title is to be free and clear of 
all liens and indebtedness of every kind except tl1e liens 
above mentioned, whlch --to be assumed by the Vendee. 
It is understood that all property is to be conveyed subject 
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to the restrictions placed on same by land company which 
developed it. 
It is further understood that said Vendee is to give to said 
Vendor, a general warranty deed to lots 6-13-14-15, in Block 
1, and lots 5-6-7-8 in Block 2, Willoughby Beach, Norfolk, 
Va., and said Vendor is to assume a loan of Eight Hundred 
Dollars on the above mentioned Willoughby Beach lots. 
Witness the following signatures and seals made 
page 18 ~ this 26th day of March, 1926. 
(Signed) 
(Signed) 
(Signed) 
(Signed) 
(Signed) 
(Signed) 
J. H. McCUEN, 
SOPHIE BUI{V A, 
By PAUL BUI<:V A, 
PAUL BUKVA, 
Al\1:ERICAN" INVESTNIENT CORP., 
SOPHIE BUKVA, ·v. P., 
PAUL BUKVA, Secy-Treas. 
(Seal) 
(Seal) 
(Seal) 
(Seal) 
(Seal) 
I will pay F. D. Matthews, Agent, $100.00 as my part of 
commission as follows: $50.00 cash when deal is closed, and 
$50.00 note due in Thirty days. 
(Signed) J. H. McCUEN. 
Note: It is stipulated by counsel that the name of Sophie 
Bukva following that of J. H. McCuen above was signed by 
Paul Bukva. 
DENNIS D. TUTTLE. 
I am one of the plaintiffs in this case. I am a resident of' 
the city of Norfolk and have been here since 1889. I have 
been in the real estate business a number of years. I was not 
present when the contract was signed, or when the exten. 
sion was made. I 'vent with Mr. Bukva and Mr. ~Iatthews 
to sec the Joynes property, and I had the negotiations with 
1\fr. Joynes. I secured his signature to the contract which is 
the bases of this suit shortly before 12 o'clock Monday, 
February 8th, 1926. I w.ent to ~Ir. Joynes' office 
page 19 ~ about 11 o'clock and found he had gone to the bar. 
her shop.· I went directly to the barber shop and 
the contract was signed by Mr. Joynes before 12 o'clock. 
"\Ve have made several deals for Mrs. Bukva which went 
through in which tvir. Bukva acted for her. I drove Mr. 
1\fatthews· to a point near Mr. Bukva 's apartment on Satur. 
day afternoon, February 6th, 1926. 
30 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
N. B. JOYNES. 
I am the N. B. Joynes whose name is signed to the contract 
of February 4th, 1926, which is the bases of this suit. I am 
a resident of the city of Norfolk of long standing and a re-
tired merchant. Mr. Dennis D. Tuttle procured my signa-
ture to this contract on Monday, February 8th, 1926. I do 
not know just what time it was, but it was around 12 o'clock. 
As soon as the contract was signed, Mr. Tuttle went out 
to phone Mr. Matthews. He came back and said he had been 
unable to get him. I owned the property at Willoughby Beach 
described in the contract and ·was ready, . able and willing 
to carry out the contract on my part; but the other parties 
have not complied with the same. 
And the defendants, to prove and maintain the issue on 
their part, introduced the following testimony: 
PAUL BUKVA. 
I am the husband of Sophie Bukva, one of the defendants 
in this case. I knew 1\fr. F. D. ~Iatthews very well, 
page 20 ~ and we were on quite friendly terms. He 'vanted 
to bring about. a trade of certain property on 35th 
Street and three acres of Lansdale belonging to my wife 
for property at Willoughby Beach belonging to Mr. N. B. 
Joynes. He talked with me about it several times, and I went 
with him and ~Ir. Tuttle to see the property. On the after-
noon of February 4th, 1926, about 6 oclock, he came to my 
house on l\fowbray Arch, and brought with him a type-
written contract. He was met at the door by Mrs. Bukva, 
who then retired to the kitchen where she was preparing 
supper. Mr. Matthews and I talked over the matter, and I 
finally signed the agreement as attorney for Sophie Bukva 
and as secretary for the American Investment Corporation, . 
which I was under the impression at the time owned the 
Lansdale property; the same was, in fact, as I afterwards 
recalled, owned by Mrs. Bukva. I signed the paper upon 
the condition that it· was to be null and void unless it was 
signed by Mr. Joynes before 12 o'clock on the following Satur-
day, and upon the further condition tbat it was not to be 
effective until Mrs. Bukva, who had never seen the Joynes 
property, should see the same and approve the trade. J\IIrs. 
Bukva did not authorize me to sign the contract for her and 
did not know I had signed the ·same until later, and when I 
tried to get her to go down to Willoughby and see the Joynes 
I 
_, 
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property she refused to go and said she 'vould not trade for 
any Willoughby Beach property. I was in favor of the deal 
myself, and when I saw Mr. Matthews on ·Saturday and he 
asked me to extend the time for obtaining 1rir. Joynes' sig-
nature until Monday at noon, I agreed, informing 
page 21} ~ir. ~iatthews, however, that Mrs. Bukva had not 
seen the Joynes property, and making it a condi-
tion that tl1e deal was not to go. through unless she should 
see the property and give her approval. I told Mr. Mal-
. thews I would try to get Mrs. Bukva to go down to see the 
property on Sunday. I made this extension ·without the 
knowledge of Mrs. Bukva. She has never acquiesced either 
in my making the contract or the extension. On Sunday we 
were out driving, and I drove by the Willoughby B.each 
house and stopped and got out and looked at the property. 
1\tirs. Bukva refused to get out of the automobile and examine 
the property and again said she had no idea of trading her 
property for any property at Willoughby Beach. I was still 
in favor of the trade which I thought was a good one, but I 
could not persuade her to see it the same way. On Mon-
day morning·, I made several efforts to get Mr. Matthews 
over the telephone to inform him that the deal was off as 
Mrs. Bukva did not 'approve, but I was unable to reach him 
until about one o'clock, when I told him :h£rs. Bukva did not 
approve the deal and that it 'vas all off. He said that Tuttle 
had gone out to look for Joynes and he had not heard from 
him. Later he phoned me that Joynes had signed the contract 
before 12 o'clock and that it was too late to do anything 
about it. :hirs. Bukva refused to carry out the trade and 
to pay any commissions to the plaintiffs. 
The power of attorney of April 16th, 1920, was given at 
· a time when Mrs. Bukva 'vas about to leave Norfolk to visit 
her sister in New York. to be gone for several months. I 
· have never acted under that power of attorney. It 
page 22 } was not formally revoked of record until after this 
suit was bronght. I do not own any real estate 
myself. 
SOPHIE BUKV A. 
I ain one of the defendants in this suit. Early in February 
Mr. F. D. ~iatthews, with whom my husband was on very 
friendly terms, came to our home late in the afternoon. I 
opened the door and invited him in, but left him with my 
· husband and ·went into the kitchen where· I was preparing 
supper. I came in the room once while Mr. Matthews was 
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there and spoke briefly to my husband, but did not ~ow 
what matter Mr. Bukva and Mr. ~fatthews were then talk1ng 
about, and the propose<;]. trade was not explained to me_ at 
that time. Aftenvards n1:r. B.ukva told me that Mr. Matthews 
wanted to arrange a trade of my property on 35th Street 
and at Lansdale, which I had gotten from my sister about 
one year before, for property at Willoughby Beach belong-
ing to 1\:l:r. N. B. Joynes. He said he thought the trade was 
a good one, but I told him I would not trade my property for 
any property at Willoughby Beach. lie urged·me to go down 
to see the Joynes property but I refused. On the follo,ving · 
Sunday we were out driving with some friends and Mr. Bukva 
stopped the car near the Joynes property and told me that 
was the property he had talked with ~fr. Matthews about 
and asked me to get out and examine it, but I told him I 
had no idea of trading for Willoughby Beach property and 
I refused to get out and see· the property. I ·did not see 
the contraet of February 4th, 1926, nor did I know· 
page 23 ~ tha.t :Nir. Bukva had signed ll!Y name to it, until 
some days after the Sunday on which ·we were at 
Willoughby Beach. I did not authorize his making this trade 
or signing the contract and I have never acquiesced in it. I 
did not see ~fr. Matthews at my l1ome on the Saturday he · 
claims to have been there. 1\fr. Bukva has never to my knowl-
edge acted under the power of attorney of April 16th, 1920, 
which 'vas formally revoked of record after this suit 'vas 
brought. He has arranged several sales and exchanges of 
property belonging to me, but they were not carried out until 
I first saw the property I was trading for and approved the 
deal, and I always signed the deeds myself. I saw the Mc-
Cuen property before tile deal was made and told Mr. Bukva 
I was 'villing for the corporation to make the trade, in fact, 
I signed my own name as vice-president to that agreement 
which was subsequent to the one in this suit. The stock 
of American Investment Corporation is owned 1;'2 by me, 
1/2 by 1vir. I van Daxm.er, except one share which is owned by 
:Nir. Bukva. I did not own any interest in the property in-
volved in the 1\fcCuen deal. It was o'vned by the American 
Investment Corporation. 
The foregoing was all of the evidence introduced by the 
plaintiffs and the defendants. 
And the defendant in due time objected to the introduction 
in evidence by the plaintiffs of the power of attorney of April' 
16th, 1920, from Sophie Bukva to Paul Bukva (Exhibit F) 
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on the ground that said power of attorney did not give to 
the attorney in fact authority to make the contract of Feb-
ruary 4th, 1926 (Exhibit A), which provided for an 
page 24 ~ exchange of properties which were acquired by the 
· defendant, Sophie Bukva, subsequent to the date 
of the said power of attorney, for certain property owned by 
N. B. Joynes, or to purchase property from Joynes, or to 
employ agents and pay defendants a commission. But the 
Court, over the objection of the defendants, by counsel, al-
lowed the said power of attorney to be introduced in evi-
dence and to go to the jury, to which action of the Court 
the said defendants, by counsel, duly excepted, and tendered 
this their first bill of exceptions, which they pray may be 
signed and sealed and made a part of the record, which is 
accordingly done. 
Given under my hand and seal, this lOth day of Septem-
ber, 1926. 
RICHARD 1\IciL"\V.A.INE, Judge, (Seal) 
To the Clerk of the Court of Law and Chancery of the 
City of Norfolk. File with the papers in this case. 
RICHARD ~I elL W .A.INE, 
Judge of the Court of Law and Chancery of the 
City of Norfolk. 
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO. 2. 
I 
Be it remembered that after the jury 'vas sworn to try 
the 11jsue joined in this cause, and after the plaintiffs and 
the defendants had introduced the evidence set forth in Bill 
of Exceptions No. 1, which is now referred to and made a 
part of this bill of exceptions, the Court instructed the jury 
as follows: 
page 25 ~ 1. The Court instructs the jury that if they be-
lieve from the evidence that the offer made on 
February 4th, 1926, and any extension thereof, was condi~ 
tioned upon its being approved by Mrs. Bukva after she saw 
the Ocean View pi~operty, and that she did not approve the 
same, they must find for the defendants. 
2. The Court instructs the jury that the burden of proof" 
is on the plaintiffs to establish tl1e right of Paul Bukva to 
make the contract in question on behalf of the defendants, 
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and unless they belieYe from the evidence that such right 
has been established by a preponderance of the evidence they 
. must find for the defendants. 
3. The Court further instructs the jury that unless they · 
believe from the evidence that Paul Bukva was authorized 
by the defendants to extend the time within which the offer 
might be accepted by Mr. Joynes, frvm Saturday to Monday, 
and that he did actually extend such time without the condi-
tion that such extension should be approved by Mrs. Bukva, 
and that the offer was actually accepted within the time 
limit, they must find for the defendants. 
4. The Court instructs the jury that the defendants had 
the right to withdraw the offer of February 4th, 1926, at any 
time before it was actually accepted, and that if they believe 
from the evidence that Paul Bukva notified the plaintiffs or 
either of them that the offer was withdrawn, or that the 
deal was off, before the offer 'vaE! actually accepted by Mr. 
Joynes, they must find for the defendants. · 
page 26 ~ 5. The Court instructs. the jury that if they be-
lieYe from the evidence that Paul Bukva was the 
agent of Mrs. Bukva with authority to execute the contract in 
evidence and with authority to extend the time of its taking 
effect 'til J\!Ionday, the 8th day of February at 12 o'clock and 
that in pursuance of such authority he executed such contract 
and· extended unconditionally the time as aforesaid and that 
in . pursuance of the terms of such extended contract, N. B. 
,Joynes was produced as the purchaser ready, willing and 
able to carry out said contract and that the defendant, Sophie 
Bukva, breached said contract, your verdict should be for 
· the plaintiff. 
And the defendants by counsel objected to the giving of 
the said instruction numbzered 5, for the reason that there 
was no legal eviden~e that Paul Bukva was the agent of the 
defendant, Sophie Bukva, with authority to execute the con-
tract of February 4th, 1926, or to extend the time at which 
it should terminate, or to appoint the plaintiffs as agents and 
agree to pay them a commission; and that the verbal exten-
sion of the contract made on Saturday was a new contract 
and could only be made in writing; but the Court overruled 
the objections of the defendants to said instruction num-
bered 5, and gave the same to the jury, to which action of 
the Court in giving the said instruction the defendants, by 
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counsel, duly excepted, and tendered this their 2nd bill of 
exceptions which they pray may be signed a~d sealed and 
made a part of the record, which is accordingly done. 
Signed and ·sealed September 10, 1926. 
RICHARD MciLWAINE, Judge, (Seal), 
page 27 ·} To the Clerk of the Court of Law and Chancery 
. of the City of Norfolk. In vacation. File with the 
papers in this case. 
RICHARD ~1ciL W AINE, 
Judge of the Court of Law and Chancery of the 
City of Norfolk. 
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO. 3. 
Be it remembered that after the jury was sworn to try 
the issue joined in this cause, and after the plaintiffs. and 
the defendants had introduced the evidence set forth in bill 
of. exceptions No.1, which is now referred to and made a part 
of this bill of exceptions, counsel for the defendants moved 
the Court to give the following three instructions in addi-
tion to the instructions offered by the defendants and given 
by the Court: 
A. The Court instructs the jury that if they believe from 
the evidence that it was agreed, when the offer of February 
4, 1926, was signed, that the same was to expire on the fol-
lo·wing Saturday, and that the. offer was not accepted by 
1\tir. Joynes until some time on Monday, they must find for. 
~he defendants. 
B.. The Court instructs the jury that if they believe from 
the evidence that it was agreed that Paul Bukva was to pay 
any commissions that might become due by reason of an ex-
change of the 35th Street and Lansdale properties, they must 
find for the defendants. 
C. The Court instructs the jury that if the plaintiff~. are 
entitled to recover in this case, they can only re-
page 28 ~ cover the commissions .on the property at Lans-
dale and 35th Street described, and not pn the 
property owned 1>Y Mr. Joynes. . 
But the. Court re.fused to give the said instruetions A, 
J3 and C; to which action of the Court refusing to give the 
35 ·supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
said three instructions, and each of them, the defendants, by 
counsel, duly excepted on the following grounds: as to in-
struction "A", that the contract of February 4, 1926, having, 
according to the testimony of the plaintiffs, ceased to be 
binding on the defendants at 12 o'clock on Saturday, Feb-
ruary 8, 1926, because it had not then been accepted by Mr • 
. Joynes, it was necessary that a ne·w contract in writing should 
be entered into before the defendants could be bound, artd 
there was no evidence of such new written contract ; as to in-
struction "B ", because the defendants did not agree to pay 
any commissions, but the agreement to pay commissions was 
made only by Paul Bukva; and as to instruction ".C", because, 
if plaintiffs were entitled to recover, it was on the ground 
that the contract of Fehn1ary 4. 1926, 'vas binding on the de-
fendants, and if it "ras so binding then N. B. Joynes could 
enforce it and the plaintiffs could coiiect of l1im l1is part 
of the commissions even though he did not cl1oose to enforce 
the contract; and the defendants tendered this their third 
bill of exceptions ,\rhich they pray may be signed and sealed 
and made a part of ti1e record, which is accordingly done. 
Signed and sealed September lOth, 1926. 
RICHARD :NI3ILWAINE, Judge, (Seal) 
' page 29 ~ To the Clerk of the Court of Law and Chancery 
of the City of N orfollr. In Vacation. File with 
the papers in this case. 
RICIIARD MoiL W AINE, 
Judge of the Court of Law and Chancery of the 
City of Norfolk. 
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO. 4. 
Be it remembered that, after the jury was sworn to try 
the issue joined in this cause, and after the plaintiffs and 
the defendants l1ad introduced the evidence set forth in bill 
of exceptions No. 1, which is now referred to and made a 
part of this bill of exceptions, counsel for the plaintiffs and 
the defendants proceeded to make their arguments before 
the jury, and during the argument on behaff of the defen-
dants, counsel was proceeding to argue that-, under the power 
of attorf!:ey of April 16th, 1920~ the authority was not broad 
enough lo authorize the contract sued on, or to embrace the 
exchange of the property in question which had been ac-
quired subsequent to the execution of said power of attorney, 
or to permit the attorney in fact to employ the plaintiffs as 
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agents and agree to pay them commissions, to which line of 
argument counsel for plaintiff objected; whereupon, the Court 
verbally instructed the jury as follows: 
You are instructed that the power of attorney of April 
16th, 1920, constituted a sufficient authority in Paul Bukva 
to enable him to make the .contract now being sued 
page 30 ~ on. 
To which action of the Court, in not permitting such argu-
ment and in giving said instruction to the jury, the defen-
dants, by counsel, duly excepted on the following grounds, 
to-wit: that the power of attorney authoriz-ed only the sale 
of real estate own~d by the defendant, Sophie Bukva, at the 
time of its date, whereas the property mentioned in the con-
tract sued on was subsequently acquired by her; that the said 
power of attorney authorized a sale and did not authorize 
an exchange or the purchase of other property; and that the 
attorney in fact under said power of attorney did not have 
authority to appoint the plaintiffs as agents and agree to pay 
them a commission; and tendered. this their 4th bill of ex-
ceptions which they pray may be signed and sealed and made 
a part of the record, which is accordingly done. Signed and 
sealed September lOth, 1926. 
RICHARD MciLWAINE, Judge, (Seal) 
To the Clerk of the Court of Law and Chancery of the 
City of Norfolk. In Vacation. File with the papers in this 
case. 
RICHARD MoiL W AINE, 
Judge of the Court of La'v and Chancery of the 
City of Norfolk. 
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO. 5. 
Be it remembered, that after the jury was sworn to try 
the issue joined in this cause, and after the plaintiffs and the · 
defendants had introduced the evidence set forth in Bill of 
Exceptions No. 1, which is now referred to and 
page 31 ~ made a part of this bill of exceptions, counsel for 
the plaintiffs and the defendants proceeded to 
make their arguments before the jury, and during the argu-
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ment on behalf of the defendants, counsel was proceeding to 
argue that, under the agreement of February 4th, 1926, the 
plaintiffs, if they were entitled to recover at all, were only 
entitled to recover such commissions as would have been due 
by the defendants if the exchange of properties had been 
finally consummated, and not the commissions N. B. Joynes 
would have had to pay in that event; to which argument, 
counsel for tlie plaintiffs objected; whereupon the. Court re-
fused to allow counsel to make such argument and instructed 
the jury in writing as follows: 
The Court instructs the jury that if they find for the plain-
tiffs they shouTd take into consideration the following ele· 
ments: 
1. ·The amount of compensation to which they would be 
reasonably entitled under the evidence as commission on the 
sale of the Bukva property. 
2. The amount to which they would be reasonably entitled 
under the evidence as commissions on the Joynes property 
if the sale had been made. 
The whole amount not to exceed the sum of $899, the 
amount claimed in the notice, and the jury may allow in-
terest from the date ·when such sum would have been due 
and payable under the. evidence. 
To which action of tl1e Court, in not permitting 
page 32 ~ such argument and in giving the said instruction 
to the jury, the defendants, by counsel, duly ex-
cepted on the ground that the plaintiffs ought not to be al-
lowed to recover in excess of the commissions on the prop-
erty of the defendants, because that was their agreement, 
and because, if plaintiffs were entitled to recover, it was 
for the reason that the contract of February 4th, 1926, was 
binding on the defendants, and if it was so binding then N. B. 
,Joynes could enforce it, and the plaintiffs could collect of him 
his part ·of the commissions even though he did not choose 
to enforce it ; and tendered this their 5th bill of exceptions, 
which they pray may be signed and sealed and made a part 
of the record. which is accordingly done. 
Signed and sealed September 'lOth, 1926. 
RICHARD MciLWAINE, Judg~, (Seal). 
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To the Clerk of the Court of Law and Chancery of the City 
of Norfolk. In vacatio;n. File with the papers in this case. 
RICHARD MciL W AINE; 
Judge of the Court of Law and Chancery of the 
City of Norfolk. 
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO. 6. 
Be it remembered that after the jury was sworn to try the 
issue joined in this cause, and during the introduction of tes-
timony by the plaintiffs (all of the evidence introduced by 
both the plaintiffs being set forth in Bill of Exceptions No. 1, 
which is now made a part of this bill of excep-
page 33 ~ tions), the plaintiffs offered in evidence a. contract 
between American Investment Corporation, ven-
dee, and J. H. McCuen, vendor, dated March 26, 1926, and 
copied into said Bill of Exceptions No. 1 as Exhibit "G", 
with the testimony of F. D. Matthews, to the irttroduction 
of which paper in ~vidence as testimony against her the de-
fendant, Sophie Bukva, by counsel, objected on the ground 
that she had no interest in the property covered by said con-
tract, and the same was executed subsequent to the contract 
of February 4th, 1926, which is the basis of this suit, but 
the Court over the objection of said Sophie Bukva allowed 
the said contract to he introduced in evidence against her, 
to which action of the Court the said defendant, Sophie Bukva, 
by counsel, duly excepted, and tenders this her sixth bill of 
excepti~ns, which she prays may be signed and sealed and 
made a part of the record, which is accordingly done. · 
Given under my hand this lOth day of September, 1926. 
RICHARD MciLWAINE, Judge, (Seal) 
To the Clerk of the Court of Law and Chancery of the City 
of Norfolk. In vacation. File with the papers in this case. 
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RICHARD MciL WAINE, 
Judge of the Court of Law and Chancery of the 
City of Norfolk. 
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO. 7. 
Be it remembered, that after the jury was sworn to try 
the issue joined in this cause, and after the plaintiffs and 
defendants had introduced the evidence set forth in Bill of 
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Exceptions No. 1, and the Court had instructed the jury as 
set forth in Bills of Exceptions Nos. 2, 4 and 5, which are now 
referred to a11:d made a part of this bill of e.xceptions, a.nd 
after the case had been argued before the jury by counsel 
for the plaintiffs and the defendants, the jury retired to 
their room and after ·about two hours returned into Court with 
the following yerdict: 
"We, the jury, find for the plaintiffs in the sum of $899." 
And thereupon, counsel for the defendants moved the Court 
to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial as to each of 
the defendants, for the reasons set forth in Bill of Exceptions 
Nos. 1 to 6, inclusive, and for the further reason that there 
was no evidence that would justify a verdict against the 
American Invesfment Corporation; but the Court, after due 
consideration, set aside the verdict only as to the defendant, 
·American Investment Corporation, and refused to set aside 
the verdict as to the defendant, Sophie Bukva, and on the 
_ 16th day of July, 1926, entered an order setting aside the 
verdict as to. American Investment Corporation, but refusing 
to set aside the verdict as to the defendant, Sophie tBukva; 
and entering juagment against her for the sum of $899.00 
( whicli was the full amount of the commissions 
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properties), with interest from the 28th day of 
April, 1926, until paid and the costs. 
To which action of the Court in refusing to set aside the 
verdict as to Sophie Bukva, and in entering said judgment 
against her, the defendant, Sophie Bukva, by counsel, duly 
excepted and tendered this her 7th bill of exceptions, which 
she prays may be signed and sealed and made a part of the 
. record, which is accordingly done. This and also bills of ex-
ceptions Nos. 1 to 6, inclusive, were signed by the Judge of 
this Court on the lOth day of September, 1926. 
RICHARD ~fciLWAINE, Judge (Seal)' 
To the Clerk of the Court of Law and Chancery of the City 
of Norfolk. In vacation. File with the papers in this case. 
RICIIARD MciLWAINE, 
Judge of the Court of Law and Chancery of the 
City of Norfolk. 
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In the Clerk's Office of the Court of Law and Chancery of 
the City of Norfolk. 
I, W. L. Prieur, Jr., Clerk of the Court of Law and Chan-
cery. of th~ City of Norfolk, do hereby certify that the fore-
going and annexed is a true transcript of the record in the 
case of F. D. Matthews and Dennis D. Tuttle, plaintiffs, vs. 
Sophie Bukva and American Investment Corporation, defen-
dants, lately pending_ in said Court. 
I further certify that the said copy was not made up and 
completed until the plaintiffs had had due notice of the mak-
ing of the same and the intention of the defendant to take an 
appeal therein. 
Given under my hand this 16th day of September, 1926. 
W. L. PRIEUR, JR., Cle1·k. 
Fee for this record, $32.00. 
A Copy-Teste: 
H. STEW ART JONES, C. C. 
- ---------, 
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